The Arab World and Iran: A turbulent region in transition, edited by Amin Saikal, was launched by the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Hon. Julie Bishop MP, on 12 December 2016. In launching the book, Ms Bishop said that Prof. Amin Saikal and CAIS have been providing high-quality work to inform the debate on the Middle East and the wider region for the past 20 years. She said that the collaboration between CAIS and the government on the challenging and contentious issues of the region is highly regarded. She congratulated Prof. Saikal on the publication of the timely, well-reasoned book, which will make a great contribution as to how Australia will manage its interests in the region.

In her assessment of the situation in the Middle East, Ms Bishop said the region was suffering from high numbers of conflict-related deaths, terrorist acts, and refugees. She said in hindsight the term ‘Arab Spring’ as a ‘one-size fits all’ understanding of the changing geopolitics of the countries of the region was ill-founded. She said the great differences between countries, the sectarian fault-lines, the emerging non-state actors, the age-old tensions and intractable problems have all re-emerged as new challenges for the global community. Ms Bishop explained that the Australian government was expanding its presence in the region with a recently opened embassy in Doha, Qatar and another embassy soon to open in Rabat, Morocco. She also outlined the developing relations between Australia and Iran following the recent lifting of sanctions from that country.

The event was opened by ANU Chancellor, Professor The Hon. Gareth Evans, who remarked that as Director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (CAIS), Professor Amin Saikal is an outstanding scholar with great academic entrepreneurial skills. He added that CAIS, as the leading Centre of its kind in Australia, indisputably holds a unique role in contributing to the debate on the affairs of the Middle East and the wider region. Professor Evans also said that the contributors to the book have provided a deeply informed analysis which is an outstanding contribution to the knowledge of the dynamics of a problematic region.

ANU Chancellor, Professor Brian Schmidt, introduced Ms Bishop and thanked both the Minister and the Government for the continued support of the university. He said that in return the ANU provides its knowledge and research to the government and the wider Australian community. He reminded the audience that ‘good public policy needs healthy open debate’ and it will be in this role that ANU will continue to be at the forefront of international events.

In his address, Professor Saikal thanked the authors who contributed chapters to the book. He said one of his ambitions in editing the volume was to inform readers of the key variables that...
**NEWS AND EVENTS**

**AWARDS**

Our warm congratulations go to the following CAIS students:

Kieran Pender has been awarded a University Medal for his thesis on Abkhazia, an unrecognised state in the Caucasus.

Research scholar Katja Theodorakis was presented with the Vice Chancellor’s media award for ‘most outstanding young talent’.

**LECTURES AND SEMINARS**

‘What went wrong with the Arab revolutions, and what is driving Middle East politics today?’ Dr Ibrahim Fraiha, Senior Fellow, Brookings Doha Center, 11 August 2016.

**BOOK LAUNCH**


**POSTGRADUATE SEMINARS**


**STAFF CHANGES/ APPOINTMENTS**

Professor Salvatore will take up his position as professor in January 2017. He is a distinguished scholar of the sociology of Islam, with a wide range of interests in related areas concerning Arab and Islamic Studies in the Middle East and globally.

Professor Salvatore comes to CAIS from a position at McGill University in Canada where he holds a professorship of Global Religious Studies (Society and Politics) and the Barbara and Patrick Keenan Chair in Interfaith Studies.

Dr Omid Behbahani has been teaching in the Persian program for three years. Her appointment has come to an end. She will be replaced by Dr Davood Hatami. His position commences in 2017.

Leila Kouatly will be appointed as an Associate Lecturer in the CAIS Arabic program in January 2017. Leila has been involved in the teaching of CAIS’ Arabic courses since 2011. She has also worked in the CAIS/CASS collaborative online language program since 2013.

Camilla Patini is acting as CAIS administrator, replacing Pamela Louradoes, who was seconded to the ANU office of Strategic Communications & Public Affairs.

**VISITING FELLOW**

Prof. Dale Eickelman will be a visiting fellow at CAIS for five weeks from February 2017. Prof. Eickelman has recently retired as Professor of Anthropology at Dartmouth College, New Hampshire.

**ROUNDTABLES**


**BOOKS PUBLISHED SINCE JULY**


The Women and Violent Extremism: Myth and Reality conference was jointly presented by ANU Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs (Bell School) and Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (CAIS) on 29 July 2016. It was convened by Dr Vanessa Newby (Bell School) and Dr Raihan Ismail (CAIS).

The conference was opened by Professor Michael Wesley (Director of Bell School) and the keynote address was given by ANU Distinguished Professor Amin Saikal (Director of CAIS). In his paper, Professor Saikal said Islamic State (IS) can be differentiated from other extremist groups by the scale of its deployment of females and the tasks with which they are assigned or coerced to perform. Under IS, Jihadi females are used as a means of governance, enforcement of the politics of brutality and slavery, and coercive processes of state building. In response to the question, how does one persuade girls and women not to join IS? Prof. Saikal stressed the importance of the global community adopting policies that result in shrinking the arena for IS and extremism by addressing the very conditions that have given rise to IS and other militant groups in the Middle East.

Speakers on the first panel presented their research on the appeal of violent Jihad to women, with particular emphasis on what were the ‘push and pull’ factors. These papers challenged the stereotypical approaches as to why women seek to join IS. Dr Sally White (Bell School) presented her research on the motivations of Indonesian women joining jihadi groups. She said it is estimated that there are 300-400 Indonesians in Syria and Iraq, however, most women travelling, are migrating as part of a family. Dr White suggested that Indonesians joining IS were attracted to a sense of belonging to a community of like-minded individuals striving to create the ideal Islamic society and state.

Research scholar Kiriloi Ingram (Bell School) presented her research on the IS publications directed at recruiting and influencing women. Based on analysis of the IS magazine Dabiq, she identified five female archetypes used in IS propaganda: the contributor, mother/sister/wife, defender/fighter, corruptor and victim.

Katja Theodorakis (CAIS) surveyed the major ‘pull factors’ drawing women to IS, including the political goal of building a utopian ‘Caliphate state’; a more just order for Muslims; a new identity based on religious ideals, morality, motherhood and marriage; and, a search for meaning through spirituality (rather than secular liberalism) as well as adventure, belonging and sisterhood.

Dr Vanessa Newby argued that while the media often portrays young women from the West as being naively drawn to Syria as an adventure, the reality is far more complex. She said second or third generation Muslims in the West can be struggling with crises of identity and it is this struggle that draws them toward radicalisation.

Dr Raihan Ismail argued that while females are enslaved by jihadi networks this is not to say they are not agents in their own right. She said IS has recruited more women than Al-Qaeda due to the appeal of the caliphate or Islamic state. She added that IS is heavily reliant on indoctrination and evidence shows that women quickly become disillusioned with the reality.

Dr Bina D’Costa (Bell School) made the point that the less frequently mentioned practice for women is in their resistance to ISIS and their ability to contribute to countering violent extremism (CVE). She said women play a vital role in CVE projects and are particularly effective within families.

A third panel addressed the theoretical, empirical and personal accounts of Islamophobia in Australia, Europe and the UK. Prof. James Piscatori argued all the evidence shows, while Islamophobia may plant the seeds of radicalisation and generate perceptions of social marginalisation, it is not one of the prime causes of radicalisation.
The Saudi ulama (learned scholars) are known for their strong opposition to Shi'a theology, Shi'a communities in Saudi Arabia, and external Shi'a influences such as Iran and Hezbollah. Their potent hostility, combined with their influence within the Saudi state and the Muslim world, has led some commentators to blame the Saudi ulama for growing sectarian conflict in the Middle East. However, there is very little understanding of the reasoning that lies behind the positions of the ulama as revealed by the polemics directed at the Shi’a by the Saudi religious establishment.

While the existence of a class of ‘Muslim Shi’i’ is recognised by many of the ulama, such statements of recognition, conferring a modicum of legitimacy, remain mere statements. There is a conspicuous absence of any commitment by most ulama who discuss Shi’ism to identify those Shi’a sects that are more acceptable (or, perhaps more accurately, less unacceptable) than others. The legitimate Shi’a remain an elusive and ill-defined group, mentioned in passing without any clear and consistent explanation of who they are or what characterises them. Moreover, some clerics do not distinguish between Shi’a sects at all when discussing Shi’a doctrines. These ulama employ the term ‘Shi’a’ liberally with no regard for a discriminating approach to different sects. It is of great significance that while some clerics are more careful and discriminating than others, those who are more discriminating do not criticise those who are not. Where the traditionalist ulama embark on critical examination of Shi’a faith, progressive ulama, who often refrain from participating in the rhetorical fire against the Shi’a, do not defend Shi’a theology and do not criticise their traditionalist colleagues for their theological demonisation of Shi’ism. This understandably creates a perception that the contemporary Saudi clerics, as a whole, find the Shi’a theologically unacceptable and that any differences are only in the desire of the progressive clerics to hold their tongues.

The rhetoric of the Saudi ulama is driven from time to time by political circumstances taking place within the Saudi kingdom and abroad. Theology is not all that matters. Many of the Saudi ulama discuss Shi’a activities, targeting Shi’a political parties, communities and individuals. These ulama are responsive to political circumstances; while there is no evidence to suggest that their underlying theological positions are shaped by politics, the manner and timing with which they attack particular Shi’a sects, communities and leaders are.

The progressive ulama seem to be more sympathetic towards Saudi Arabian and Bahraini Shi’a but take a similar stand to their traditionalist colleagues when speaking about Hezbollah (following the group’s support for Bashar al-Assad) and Iran. However, despite their dislike for Iran and Hezbollah, they refrain from overtly employing sectarian justifications in their criticisms. More often than not, these clerics examine the political situations in the region in strategic terms. These ulama are small in number and do not criticise the approaches of the dominant traditionalist clerics.

The extent of the polemics directed at the various Shi’a communities in Saudi Arabia is motivated by the activities of those communities within the Saudi state. In the book, *Saudi Clerics and Shi’i Islam*, I compare attitudes of the Najdi ulama to the positions of the contemporary Saudi ulama after the 1978/79 Iranian revolution, and the positions of those ulama to different communities within the kingdom, and found that a pattern of opposition exists based on the political circumstances of the day. The Najdi ulama focused on the theological corruption of the Shi’a faith and made attempts to convert the Shi’a living in the al-Asa’ region (which was inclusive of Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, modern day Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates). The subjugation of the inhabitants of al-Asa’ made the Shi’a in this region less threatening to Wahhabi teachings and the authority of the Saudi ruling family. The Najdi ulama concentrated greater efforts on attacking other non-Wahhabis such as the Ottomans and the Hashemites.

The Iranian revolution brought about renewed attention from the domestic Shi’a. It is well established by existing research that Saudi Arabia’s Shi’a population was to a large extent inspired by the Iranian revolution, revolting against the Saudi government. The government responded by suppressing the revolts and the ulama provided cover for the ruling family to do so. The Shi’a transnationalism promoted by Iranian leaders following the 1978/79 revolution, which spilled into Saudi Arabia, influenced the rhetoric of the Saudi religious establishment. The Saudi ulama, especially the traditionalists, characterised the Shi’a as treacherous and disloyal to the Saudi nation; such accusations are absent from the rhetoric of the Najdi ulama.

As Shi’a leaders including Hassan al-Saffar promoted reconciliation and abandoned their anti-regime positions in the 1990s, so the Saudi ruling family sought rapprochement. This new era of reconciliation was acknowledged by high profile government clerics including the former grand mufti of the kingdom, Shaykh Ibn Baz (in 1993), and the popular progressive ‘alim Shaykh Salman al-’Awadh. It must be noted that although these clerics agreed to participate in the government’s open dialogue with the Shi’a, there is no evidence to suggest that such dialogue has transformed their underlying theological attitudes towards the Shi’i’ism, which further proves the underlying and undisturbed nature of the theological convictions of the clerics. When pressed, Al-’Awadh declared that the theological divisions within the two sects could not possibly be bridged and Shaykh Ibn Baz continued his theological assaults on the Shi’a. However, it must be acknowledged that al-’Awadh and other progressive ulama such as ‘Awad al-Qarni speak about national reconciliation and often refrain from employing sectarian rhetoric when discussing the Shi’a.

Traditionalist clerics refuse to recognise reconciliatory measures taken by particular Shi’a leaders. Despite rapprochement efforts in the 1990s, Shaykh Nasir al-Umar continued to issue statements against the Shi’a within the kingdom, accusing them of evil intentions and hatred towards the Sunni population. His treatise, *Waqqi’ al-Rafidah fi Bilad al-Tawhid*, published in 1993 and endorsed by other ulama, outlined inflammatory arguments against the Shi’a living in the Eastern Province and promoted the alienation and isolation of the Shi’a community there. Many traditionalist ulama continue to endorse Shaykh al-’Umar’s observations, posting the treatise on their websites and supporting the claims in lectures and sermons. Although the article was published in 1993, it has been used by other traditionalist ulama to refer to Shi’a activities as recently as 2009.
The Saudi government has done little to improve the condition of the Saudi Shi’a; many remain unhappy with the continuous economic, social and political marginalisation of their community. It becomes more and more difficult for Shi’a leaders to discourage the Shi’a from publicly expressing their grievances by taking to the streets. The 2011 Arab uprisings galvanised anti-Saud sentiment among the Saudi Shi’a, especially after the government intervened in neighbouring Bahrain and cracked down on protesters in the Eastern Province. The traditionalist ulama came out in support of the ruling family and re-ignited the fear of Shi’a transnationalism, questioning the loyalties of the Shi’a within the Saudi kingdom and casting them as agents of Iran. Although Shi’a leaders consistently reiterated that they did not seek to undermine the authority of the Saudi ruling family, many traditionalist clerics rejected their sincerity. Saudi Arabia’s progressive clerics have promoted reconciliation; they pragmatically view Shi’a grievances as a potential tool for Iran to exploit. However, their more reconciliatory approach is carefully constructed so as not to offend their traditionalist colleagues.

This history demonstrates the responsiveness of the Saudi ulama to external political factors. The conclusion that external events shape the nature of their rhetoric is not particularly surprising, but it does show that the ulama do not live in a theological cocoon; they are keen to counter the influence of political Shi’ism in the Muslim world. That has especially been the case with Iran, which since the Iranian revolution has ascended to the position of rival to Saudi Arabia’s leadership of the Muslim world notwithstanding the global minority status of the Shi’a within Islam. When it comes to the Saudi clerical views of Iran, very few distinctions can be made between progressives and traditionalists. The progressive ulama are equally as suspicious as the traditionalists of Iran’s intentions in the region, and blame Iran for many of the problems involving the Shi’a in Arab countries.

The Saudi ulama take a keen interest in the geopolitics of the region and are constantly alert to the Shi’a activities within the Saudi kingdom and abroad, no matter how accurately informed they are about those activities. The pattern of anti-Shi’a polemics is based on political events taking place internally and externally even if the underlying reason for those polemics is theological.

As a whole, the Saudi ulama are a group of actors working to influence sectarian discourse in the region. History has shown that although theology is the foundation of the anti-Shi’a narratives propagated by the ulama, geopolitics remains a crucial factor determining the intensity, timing, focus and content of their words.

Ra‘ihan Ismail is an Associate Lecturer at CAIS. This is an edited extract from her book, ‘Saudi Clerics and Shi’a Islam’, OUP, 2016.
have placed the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) regions in the positions they are in today. He said that although the Islamic State is in retreat, and may cease to exist in its present form, this on its own will not end the region’s deep-seated problems. The fact is, there are too many internal and external actors, with conflicting agendas. The current military operations will work up to a point, but there needs to be a comprehensive political strategy to address the conditions that have given rise to violent extremism in the region. These conditions include authoritarian rule, social and economic disparities and injustices, and occupation, as in the case of Palestinian lands. Also in need of redress are the local power rivalries and the repeated major power interventions designed to shape the region to their ideological and geopolitical preferences. A viable resolution of these conditions requires national structural reform and regional cooperation, with the assistance but not military interventions by outside powers. He warned that unless the current transition is handled prudently, a more disturbing MENA region may arise.

Professor Saikal said that during his long years of studying the Middle East and the role of Islam as a global religion, he had not witnessed as much pain and despair as there is today. He said the rise of Islamophobia, bigotry, and protectionism in Western democracies make it more incumbent upon CAIS and ANU to promote a better understanding of Islam and the Middle Eastern, North African and Central Asian regions so as to foster academic bridges in these areas.

Professor Saikal thanked Ms Bishop for taking time from her busy schedule to launch the book. He also thanked the Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor for being so supportive of the Centre and himself personally, he then invited the V-C to introduce five other important books that the staff of the Centre have published this year. The books are:

- **Raihan Ismail, Saudi Clerics and Shi’a Islam,** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp 328.)
- **France Meyer, Frankensteine à Bagdad - Ahmed Saadawi,** (Piranha, Paris, 2016, pp 378.)

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**BOOK LAUNCH: THE POLITICAL ODYSSEY OF A PAKISTANI WOMAN**

Syeda Abida Hussain’s book, *Power Failure: The Political Odyssey of a Pakistani Woman*, was launched at CAIS on 20 October 2016. The launch was jointly hosted by the ANU Coral Bell School and the ANU Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies.

Minister in the Nawaz Sharif government in the 1990s, and Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States from 1991-1994, Syeda Hussain has detailed 40 years of experience in the book.

 Guests at the launch included HE Mrs Naela Chohan, High Commissioner for Pakistan.

The book was launched by Professor Michael Wesley, Dean, ANU College of Asia & the Pacific. In launching the book, Professor Wesley remarked on the importance of Pakistan in regional and global politics, due to both its population size and strategic positions. He went on to give an erudite account of Hussain’s experience as a Shia, a woman, and a politician in a country with the most tumultuous of histories. He observed that Hussain held a great love for Pakistan, but was at the same time, greatly disappointed by it.

Syeda Abida Hussain was the first woman to be popularly elected as Member of the National Assembly of Pakistan. She served as Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States from 1991 to 1994. She has also served as Minister for Education, Science and Technology (1996), Minister for Food and Agriculture (1997), Minister for Population Welfare, and as Minister for Environment and Urban Affairs (1999).

In *Power Failure: The Political Odyssey of a Pakistani Woman*, published by Oxford University Press in 2015, Syeda Abida Hussain outlines the impacts that key political events in Pakistan have had on her personal life — and on the destiny of the nation. In her CAIS lecture, she illustrated the many difficulties associated with being elected as a female politician in Pakistan. She also described the tumultuous history of recent Pakistani politics in some detail giving an insider’s view of political events from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s rule in the early 1970s to the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in 2007. Her next book is a biography of Ms Bhutto with an emphasis on the events that led to her assassination.
Five years have passed since several Arab countries revolted against their repressive regimes, and peace and stability are nowhere in sight. The unravelling of their political systems pushed these countries into challenging transition processes where violence is always a serious possibility. Libya's civil war presents a blunt example of a failed transition, raising concerns about protracted political instability, not only there, but potentially in neighbouring countries as well. Tunisia theoretically managed to complete its transition successfully. It ratified a new constitution, addressing the need for a new social contract, and held two rounds of elections. Tunisia also passed a transitional justice law to provide a framework for adjudicating both victims' grievances and perpetrators' crimes of the past political era. Nonetheless, Tunisia finds its stability challenged by increasing levels of polarisation between its various societal segments.

The fact of the matter is that political transitions take a long time—years if not decades—and transitioning countries face the risk of violence. Arab Spring societies are unlikely to transition to sustainable peace and stability as long as they are wracked by deep divisions. Therefore, national reconciliation is paramount to reducing the societal polarisation that currently cripples Libya and threatens Tunisia's progress. To attain enduring peace and stability, post-revolution states must engage in inclusive national reconciliation processes, including a national dialogue, a truth-seeking effort, the reparation of victims' past injuries, dealing with—the truth about the past is also essential. Relatedly, determining how to handle former regime elements has profound implications for post-revolution transitions. Libya opted to purge all those who served in Muammar Qaddafi's regime through adopting its 'Political Isolation Law'. Tunisia, on the other hand, has adopted a transitional justice law that mandates, among other measures, the investigation and prosecution of the state's crimes since 1955. While the resulting Truth and Dignity Commission has received thousands of complaints from victims of past abuses, progress has otherwise been slow, as the body has struggled to establish an effective organisational structure or execute a clearly defined work plan. Controversy over the selection of commissioners and an overall lack of publicity has also hindered the truth-seeking process.

Reparations are another important part of the pursuit of justice and healing. Done correctly, they can bring previously marginalised and abused segments of society back into the mainstream, where they can make positive contributions to the development of the country. Tunisians experienced extensive human rights violations during the decades-long reign of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, and lacks the resources to engage in any meaningful and comprehensive rehabilitation of victims of past abuses. This left the country's transition process struggling with a major component—the victims—feeling further marginalisation added to their past traumas. Libya, however, who has the resources to fund a process of thorough rehabilitation of victims of its dictatorship, slid into civil war that prevented the proper addressing of past wounds.

Even if these societies overcome their polarisation at the personal level, however, they will not accomplish successful transitions unless their healing is accompanied by institutional reforms. After the collapse of the Qaddafi regime, revolutionaries and militias demanded a purge as a method of institutional reform—similar to de-Baathification in Iraq. The purge contributed to the outbreak of a civil war. Tunisia, on the other hand, approached institutional reform from a different angle and succeeded in putting together a sound formula, but it is facing serious challenges to implementation.

Ultimately, a variety of actors have played key roles in Libya and Tunisia's national reconciliation processes. In all three countries, women have been integral to bringing about change, and must continue to be involved in reshaping their countries. As agents of change, women helped to initiate the uprisings in Libya, and have already proven to be effective agents of reconciliation. In Libya, tribes are key stakeholders that must be incorporated after decades of manipulation and marginalisation. Depending on the way they become involved, tribes could play a key role in either stabilising or destabilising transitions. Domestic civil society groups have been essential to Tunisia's progress so far, and are fast developing in Libya. Their continued involvement—and assistance from international groups—will go a long way toward consolidating new states that honour human and civil rights.

The processes of national dialogue, truth seeking, reparation, accountability, and institutional reform, especially if supported by key agents of reconciliation, including women, civil society, and tribes, can combine to create the momentum needed to bridge divides and help post-Arab Spring societies move toward sustainable peace, stability, and development.
At around 8pm on a warm Friday night on 15 July, most Turkish families were zapping between pre-season soccer matches and several popular soap operas on television. An abrupt storm of phone calls was the first sign of the unusual hours ahead: ‘Change the channel to the TRT, the state channel!’ Then, out of blue, the words ‘breaking news’ appeared on the screens of every channel. It was followed by: ‘An attempt to overthrow the government by a group in the army has been ongoing’. Later in the night people in Ankara and Istanbul were thrilled by the low flights of the fighter jets from their windows.

It was an unexpected coup by a rather small group in the military against both the government and the top chiefs of the army. On the night of the coup, the plotters interrogated the Head of the Army, Heads of the Land Forces and the Chief Commanders of the Navy and the Air Force. Akıncı Air Base in Ankara was the headquarters of the plotters and most of the interrogated four-star generals were carried there later that night. President Erdogan and the government were quick to point out the network of Fethullah Gulen in the army were the plotters of the putsch. Even with the long record of military interventions throughout Turkey’s Republican era, this coup attempt was a complete surprise as most people believed the army’s power to overthrow the government was minimal.

What is more absurd, is the fact the bridges over the Bosphorus were closed, but only in one direction. Five months after the incident it is still an incomprehensible mystery as to why the traffic from the Anatolian side to European side was blocked by the military, but the traffic in the reverse direction was left open.

In any case, when President Erdogan appeared on CNN-Turk via Facetime after midnight and called the people to invade the streets, it became obvious that the plot was doomed to fail. In the same hour, pro-government television stations started to spread a quote from ‘unknown security sources’ that ‘the plotters were Gulenists’.

One of the distinctive features of the coup was the use of the mosques as a platform of resistance by the government. From the minarets, people were called to the streets throughout the night to stop the tanks. The use of mosques all over the country for political mass mobilisation was unprecedented in Turkey, and it demonstrated that the regime would not hesitate to use the masses for their political purposes. Mass or ‘crowd’ psychology can easily transform into brutal actions similar to those of past totalitarian regimes. The severe mob beatings of conscripted soldiers on the Bosphorus Bridge, for example, may be the harbinger of future mass cruelty. Another unprecedented move in these recent events was the random shooting by the coup plotters towards the ammassed crowds. For the first time in their history of coups, the Turkish people were exposed to haphazard mass shooting.

None of the other political parties supported the coup attempt; the Kemalist/centre-left Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi and the far-right Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, condemned the coup in the early hours. The leaders of the pro-Kurdish Halkların Demokratik Partisi also made a declaration against the coup. The plot was suppressed but success came at a cost, with 264 killed, of which 173 were civilians, 62 police officers, five military personnel and 24 coup plotters. In addition, 1535 people including 50 coup plotters were wounded.

The following week saw a witch-hunt carried out by the government across the state apparatus, which ironically had been
filled with followers of the Gulen movement by the very same AKP government during the first decade of its rule. The first month after the plot, Turkey has been in a ‘state of madness’. Daily mass rallies fed by extensive mass mobilisation were accompanied by campaigns against pop stars, celebrities, media personalities who were not seen at these pro-government anti-coup demonstrations. Staunch supporters of Erdogan filed the squares of all cities every night to ‘guard their democracy’.

After the National Security Council and cabinet meetings on 20 July, a three-month state of emergency was declared. According to the Turkish Constitution, a state of emergency authorises the President to rule by decree, bypassing the Parliament and the Cabinet; an all-powerful Presidency, long-campaigned for by Erdogan. With his new sultanic powers, the President issued the first decree on 23 July. It extended the time limit on detention without trial of those arrested from 24 hours to one month.

The same decree also included shutting down 35 private hospitals, 1,043 private education institutions including primary, secondary and high schools, as well as, student dorms located all over Turkey, and 1,229 foundations and associations and 19 trade unions. Fifteen private universities were added to the list. Meanwhile, Turkey announced a temporary suspension of the European Convention on Human Rights. On 27 July, the second presidential decree by Erdogan targeted media outlets including 16 national and local TV channels and 45 newspapers.

With the first two decrees, 44,530 civil servants had been discharged from various state institutions. As expected, hardest hit has been the Ministry of Education, with approximately half of the dismissed personnel being teachers.

The initial state of emergency proclaimed on 20 July for three months was extended for a further three months. Erdogan’s de facto sultanic power, which he had been eager to hold through constitutional change, had emerged into an all-powerful presidential system. With the last two decrees on 22 November, President Erdogan issued twelve edicts under the state of emergency each of which consisted of long lists of public servants to be purged from all levels of the bureaucracy.

The instant effect of the witch-hunt under the state of emergency was the elimination of an alternative Islamist power contender by the existing Islamist government. This is expected to pave the way for the monopolisation of the Islamist playground under the JDP. More importantly, confiscation of the property of the Gulen network and its transfer to pro-JDP charities and foundations will enlarge the economic base of Erdogan’s authoritarian Islamism. Purging the pro-Gulen teachers, shutting down their schools, universities, affiliated civil society organisations, confiscating newspapers and TV stations, all of which flourished under Erdogan, would enable him to fill the emptied posts with his bona fide loyalists.

Another result of the coup is the damage to the Turkish army’s credibility in the eyes of the public. The army has always been a most trusted institution throughout Turkish society. The Turkish officer category formed a separate class of people trained with a particular military mentality. The army has been a closed lifetime career for officers with its own rules, hierarchy and sense of ‘historical duty’. It recruits through military high schools and academies. It also has its own military justice, military hospitals and army houses in every city. These institutions were instrumental in making army personnel distinct from the rest of society. The decree of 31 July shut down all military facilities and enforced the creation of alternative institutions managed by civilians.

The coup has granted President Erdogan the opportunity to rule through firman as the de facto sultan under a State of Emergency. Erdogan will seek to extend the emergency rule until the constitutional referendum which will facilitate further uncertainty and instability in the system to provide him with the justification to continue his reign. In the absence of the rule of law and facing the regime’s addiction to high tension, the greatest remaining challenge for Erdogan’s presidential dreams may come from the economic sphere.

Murat Yurtbilir is an Associate Lecturer at CAIS.

THE JACKY ANNE SUTTON PRIZE AWARDED

The Jacky Anne Sutton prize was established as a tribute to Jacky Sutton, her life and work. Ms Jacky Sutton passed away in tragic circumstances on 18 October 2015. She was a research scholar at CAIS from January 2014. She had already accomplished much as a journalist and humanitarian activist, working with the BBC and several international organisations, including UN agencies. In all her endeavours, she was clearly focused on helping the needy and improving the role of women in public life.

The Jacky Anne Sutton prize was set up with the support of the Research School of Social Sciences, College of Arts and Social Sciences, ANU. It is to be awarded annually to the student with the best results in the course ‘Politics in the Middle East’.

This year the prize will be awarded to two students: Megan Lingerfelt and Christopher Burns. They received the prize for achieving equal top marks in the course ‘Politics in the Middle East’.
CAIS held its annual Advisory Board Meeting on 5 September 2016. The following board members attended the meeting: Prof. The Hon. Gareth Evans, ANU Chancellor; Prof. Brian Schmidt, ANU Vice-Chancellor; The Hon Sussan Ley, MP; Dr Anne Aly, MP (via conference call); Ms Gai Brodtmann, MP; Mr Richard Gibbs, Macquarie Bank; Prof. Deane Terrell, Visiting Fellow, ANU College of Business and Economics; Prof. Matthew Gray (representing the Dean, ANU College of Arts & Social Sciences); Prof. Jim Piscator, CAIS; and Prof. Amin Saikal, CAIS Director.

Prof. Schmidt chaired and opened the meeting by welcoming the attendees. In his report, Prof. Saikal welcomed a new board member, Dr Anne Aly, the newly elected MP for Cowan, WA, and thanked members of the board whose terms were coming to an end: The Hon. Warren Snowden, The Hon. Melissa Parke and Mr Bob Sercombe. He went on to inform the board of the Centre’s activities and achievements in teaching, research, public policy and outreach in 2015.

The members of the Advisory Board discussed a range of issues in the meeting. There was a discussion on the CAIS outreach and public policy program; suggestions were made as to how CAIS may further develop its already extensive activities in this area to meet the growing demand from government agencies and departments. It was noted that the CAIS language programs have been successful in building significant growth in student numbers.

Another issue addressed in the meeting was the future growth of the Centre, in terms of both staff and Higher Degree student numbers, and related to this, the limitations that ensue from the size of the CAIS building. The possibilities for extending the building were discussed.
The political void left by the 2003 collapse of the Saddam regime had to be renegotiated amongst a leadership deeply divided across ethno-sectarian lines. Iraqi women were primed and enthusiastic to play a substantive role in the reconstruction phase. However, the foundational and infrastructural preconditions needed for successful democratisation were lacking. The interventionists demanded the creation of a reconstructive plan and the drafting of a constitution according to a strict timetable driven primarily by Western interests and objectives. The 2006 constitutional laws of governance, focussed heavily on avoiding future autocracies and failed to foster inclusive roles for all segments of society towards rebuilding the polity. Upon this stage, the role of women in politics became a central topic of debate between the interventionists and a host of Iraqi groups representing competing ideologies. Institutionalising the gender quota in the Iraqi constitution was a product largely of women's civil activism and international influences. Yet the fact that the quota remains in force has implications for the social meanings ascribed to female politicians in a country with a long tradition of male politicians in a country with a long tradition of male political power and control. Until a more notable successes and their political reputations established, interaction and cooperation among women MPs have been limited. Different and sometimes conflicting ethnic and sectarian identities among MPs may account for this tendency, but it may also be explained by necessarily closer links with key male politicians or by an admirable focus on constituency work rather than broader alliance-building.

The primary focus of my research is whether the gender quota had any impact on the descriptive, substantive or symbolic representation of Iraqi women in the elections of 2005, 2010, and 2014.

The gender quota has led to a significant increase in women’s descriptive representation in the Iraqi parliament; that is, the number of women parliamentarians has increased. However, deeper analysis reveals that the gender quota has had minimal value to support Iraqi female MPs as political agents. Women who do become elected generally rely upon sources outside the quota to support their campaigns and parliamentary functions. Whilst the women who gain parliamentary seats come from diverse ethnic, religious, educational, and experiential backgrounds, they share many common challenges in their political roles, including competing demands of work and family; financial burdens; resistance and exclusion from political party leadership; and most importantly, the relentless violence and insecurity that have prevailed in Iraq since the invasion.

What strides Iraq has made towards democratisation serve as both supports and barriers to Iraqi women achieving substantive representation. Whilst female MPs have made some significant contributions to political processes and policies, the backlash against interventionist democracy promotion has led to the institutionalisation of religious-cultural values that weaken the influence of women in the political domain. It must be noted that parliamentarians of both genders face significant obstacles to exercising true political efficacy. However, men in Iraq's Parliament have influenced substantially more public policies at the national and international level than have women, whose political voice tends to be marginalised and confined to those issues of concern to women, children, and family.

Analysis of the ways in which Iraqi female MPs are represented in the media reveals that women are far from achieving the symbolic capital requisite to attain legitimacy as political agents. Women in public office rarely appear in the press. When they do, their political agency is marginalised and their capabilities questioned. The press and male politicians accuse the gender quota of being responsible for placing inexperienced, incapable women into office. Still, Iraqi female MPs have gained some support, such as increased access to the media for political campaigning and reaching constituents; improved voter attitudes; and greater value placed upon gaining a female counterpoint to male political views. The emerging social media has contributed to increasing women's empowerment as political actors. It must be noted that the media outlets emerging since 2005 have greatly contributed to Iraq's ethno-sectarian rifts and have exacerbated and encouraged sectarian violence. These tensions particularly affect women serving in political, civic, and journalistic positions. Therefore the symbolic representation achieved thus far, has failed to create avenues for gaining political power and control. Until a more independent media environment has been created, true symbolic representation for women cannot be achieved.

The scope of women's ministries could be expanded to include their input on broader national issues. Political parties could also be encouraged to promote their female members to decision-making roles. Female MPs need support to focus on the specific needs of their constituents to garner increased respect and backing.

Improving women’s representation is closely linked to the socio-economic position of women in general. Women's inferior economic and social status is reinforced by persistent patrimonial religious (whether Sunni or Shii), tribal, and often family attitudes, which, if not directly hostile, are unsupportive of, a culture of gender equality. Women's equal access to employment opportunities is one achievable step forward. Moreover, potential candidates need concrete incentives, such as campaign subsidies to enhance their roles.

Although individual women have had notable successes and their political reputations established, interaction and cooperation among women MPs have been limited. Different and sometimes conflicting ethnic and sectarian identities among MPs may account for this tendency, but it may also be explained by necessarily closer links with key male politicians or by an admirable focus on constituency work rather than broader alliance-building. However, women's coalitions built across party lines would help to minimise conflicts and magnify women’s voices on critical policy issues. The capacity of Iraqi women to represent their constituencies, monitor executive bodies, and enact or reform laws to eradicate state-sanctioned gender violence might be strengthened by collaboration with the Ministry of Women and other women’s organisations.

The ability of women to function as effective democratic agents is severely limited by the lack of security. A stable political order and a supportive political culture are stymied by the failure to meet this primary duty of a state. Indeed, the most immediate and critical component of the Iraqi experience that must be addressed in order for women to achieve complete substantive and symbolic agency as politicians is the ethno-sectarian divisiveness and its accompanying violence. If the insurgency can be overcome and stability ensues, only then will Iraqi women have the opportunity to realise full legitimacy, agency, and power in functioning parliamentary roles.
FRANKENSTEIN À BAGDAD

by France Meyer

Francine Meyer’s translation of the novel, Frankenstein à Bagdad by Ahmed Saadawi, was published by Pirhana Press in 2017. The translation of this 378-page masterpiece from Arabic to French, including many of the revered writers of Arabic texts, such as: Naguib Mahfouz, Najwa Barakat, Raif Badawi and Abdul Rahman Mounif. France’s review of Frankenstein à Bagdad is presented below:

Born in 1973, Ahmad Saadawi lives in Baghdad and is a talented young novelist, poet and essayist, and a producer of documentary films. He is the author of a book of poetry and three novels. In 2014 Saadawi received the prestigious International Prize for Arabic Fiction (IPAF). He is the first Iraqi to receive this prize.

Frankenstein in Baghdad is a fantasy novel, that opens in the summer of 2005 in the district of Batawini, and ends a year later. Fiction mingle with reality, and actual events, such as the catastrophic incident of the Al-Aima Bridge in August 2005, are incorporated into the plot.

The main characters are: Elishua, an elderly Christian widow, whose son, Daniel, disappeared during the Iran-Iraq war; Hadi al-Attag, or Hadi ‘the rag and bone man’, who lives in the neighbouring house, a rubble called the Jewish ruin. The death of his young work partner in an explosion turns him into a bitter alcoholic, and he starts to scour the city in search of body parts that he stitches together, unintentionally ‘giving life’ to a creature that will appear in the novel under several names, ‘The Nameless’, ‘Criminal X’ or ‘Frankenstein’; Mahmoud al-Sawadi is a young journalist from the province of Maysan in southeast Iraq who lives in the same neighbourhood as Elishua and Hadi. Mentored by his new boss, he becomes the chief editor of the magazine Al-Haqqa. In his quest for a good story, he befriends Hadi who entrusts him with the story of the Nameless; Majid Muhammad Surur, brigadier of the ‘Monitoring and Intervention Brigade’, predicts the future for government officials and must guess the plans of a cohort of suicide bombers of all factions. With the help of a clique of astrologers, he tries to arrest and eliminate the Nameless, so as to ensure his own personal success.

The book is set after the invasion of Iraq by the United States-led coalition resulted in the defeat of the Iraqi army, the execution of Saddam Hussein and the establishment of a new government. Iraq then became the scene of a violent civil war between several groups of insurgents, the Shiite and Sunni militias, terrorist groups including Al-Qaeda, the US military and the forces of the new Iraqi government.

The Nameless, a creature both repulsive and moving, attempts to avenge the death of the people whose flesh he is made of, and who he presumes are innocent victims. Hadi al-Attag’s first mission is to avenge the innocent victims of whose flesh he is made. Hadi’s neighbour, the old Elishua, mistakes the creature for her missing son and gives it asylum in her house. However, once ‘avenged’, the pieces of the Nameless body break down and fall off, threatening his survival. He therefore urgently seeks organs and limbs of random men, whose honesty and innocence he cannot prove. This spoils his image forever and defeats his noble goal. His existence and mission have no meaning anymore; he must kill to survive and avenge his own victims.

Despite the intrinsic violence of the novel, graphic at times, Saadawi shows a real affection towards his characters whose weaknesses he describes with much compassion. The fantasy elements of the plot, the Brigadier’s astrologers, the divining powers of the Nameless, not to mention the ‘creature’ itself, add an almost comical and entertaining twist to the intrigue.

The style is fluid, the grammar impeccable, the language clear and lively with fragments of Iraqi dialect. The main characters convey the same story from multiple angles, the author thus avoiding the pitfalls of a linear narration, and a series of incidents keep the reader alert until the end. Saadawi carefully avoids all the clichés inherent to the violence of the civil war. He encourages us to reflect on our responsibility, beyond the framework of the Iraqi conflict, and thus, gives his story a universal value.

Not surprisingly, this novel enjoyed immediate success in the Arab world. In the realm of Arabic literature where realism usually dominates, the incursion of fantasy was sure to attract a diverse audience. It has been translated into several European languages. The universality of the themes, the originality of the plot and the quality of the writing will ensure its international success.

France Meyer is an Associate Lecturer at CAIS
Dr Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a Fellow at the Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, led a roundtable discussion at CAIS on 1 November. Dr Coates Ulrichsen’s research examines the changing position of Persian Gulf states in the global order, as well as the emergence of longer-term, non-military challenges to regional security. Coates Ulrichsen has published extensively on the Gulf. His most recent book is ‘The Gulf States in International Political Economy’, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) and ‘The United Arab Emirates: Power, Politics, and Policymaking’, (Routledge, 2016).

Dr Ulrichsen discussed the rise of the Gulf States as interventionist regional powers for policy-making in the Middle East and North Africa as the region emerges unsteadily from the Arab Spring. The evidence that Gulf officials are prepared to ‘go it alone’ and act unilaterally or, at best, as a loose regional bloc to secure their interests in transition states, is evident most visibly in coalition military operations in Syria and Yemen but is also a feature of Gulf policies elsewhere as well. Dr Ulrichsen explained how different GCC states backed different sides at various points and aid was provided not impartially but was instead linked to particular political currents rather than being tied to outcomes such as reforms to governance or improvements in transparency. While the emergence of the Gulf States as visible global actors predated the Arab Spring, it acquired a potent new dimension once the initial shock of the upheaval had subsided.

Dr Ulrichsen concluded his talk with an account of the internal political and economic constraints on the Gulf states. They have up till now been able to create political stability with economic patronage and generous concessions to their populations. But reduced oil revenue and growing populations mean the days of economic extravagance and social quiet are numbered.

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CAIS postgraduate research scholars have continued to run the Majlis discussion group in second semester. The term majlis is used in both Arabic and Persian to describe a regular gathering of like-minded individuals. The CAIS group has continued to provide a space for scholars and the public to meet and share their thoughts on contemporary events across the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. It has also provided an opportunity for scholars to present their own original research and hear feedback from their peers. Topics discussed this semester include: 'Post-2003 Iraq and Prospects for National Unity'; 'What is Islam?'; 'The Politics of the Sect'; 'Libya Post-Qadhafi: Transition, Conflict, and Prospects for Peace'; 'Coup Attempt in Turkey: Background, the Plot and the Aftermath'; 'Russia in the Middle East: Beyond Syria'; 'The Israeli-Palestinian Two-State Solution: Viability and Alternatives'; 'Wither Orientalism? Islam and the West'; 'Off the Pitch: Sport, Diplomacy, and Nation-building'; and 'The Refugee Crisis'.

Over the semester, there has been a range of speakers leading these discussions including external specialists, academics and research scholars from both CAIS and across ANU. Audience members have attended from various government departments and agencies, the student body and interested individuals.

The core group of research scholars convening the Majlis are planning to keep it running in 2017. There will be a new stimulating program of events intended to promote discussion and analysis on current and important issues as they develop. Guests are welcome to join this group at any stage of the semester and topic suggestions will be considered.
PERSIAN PROGRAM

Zahra Taheri, (pictured left) has taken leave during the summer break to study the unpublished Persian manuscripts at the Bodleian Library, in Oxford. The subject of her research is ‘Women in Persian Ethical Texts’. She was successful in applying for the Bahari Visiting Fellowship in the Persian Arts of the Book at the Bodleian Libraries. The Bodleian’s Persian collections date back to the early 17th century and consist of approximately 2,500 manuscript codices containing 5,000 works in all classical disciplines. Particularly well represented are histories, biographies, and classical Persian poetry. The collection of illustrated manuscripts containing miniatures is world class. Persian ethical texts are valuable and rare sources for the investigation of the moral values and manners of the Iranian peoples throughout history. As mirrors of popular culture and ways of life, these writings have received attention from both Western scholars and Persian literary figures (with respect to their historical and literary dimensions). Dr Taheri’s research will be based on the issue of women in this genre of literature, as it has not received significant attention to date. She is particularly focusing on the concept of Akhlâq, which is the knowledge of the good and evil of morals and manners. The word also refers to a literary form of writing on ethics, which covers all areas concerning association with one’s fellows. Importantly, almost all of the ethical texts have a section on women. These chapters cover the qualities and duties required of women, as well as what were interpreted as the good and evil aspects of the character of women. This material provides a fascinating window into the social life of the times with particular reference to the roles and status of women. Dr Taheri’s goal is to search for unpublished Persian ethical manuscripts, which she hopes will shed more light on the presence of women in Persian ethical texts. The material will be used for a book which is to be published in 2017.

PRIZES FOR PERSIAN LANGUAGE AND IRANIAN HISTORY AND CULTURE

The Persian Program has three prizes which are awarded annually. The Sa’id Foundation for the Promotion of Persian language and literature donates two prizes, the Khayyam Prize, for the best results in Introductory Persian, and the Hafez Prize, for the best results in Intermediate Persian. Dr Hashem Etmnian, Chief Executive of the Iranian/Persian Cultural Foundation in Canberra, donates a prize for the best results in the Iranian History and Culture course. In 2016, the Khayyam Prize will go to Nigarish Hyder, the Hafez Prize is to be awarded to Samuel Blanche, and the Hashem Etmnian prize will be shared by Emily Rowbotham and Nicholas Porter.

PERSIAN LECTURER’S TERM COMES TO A CLOSE

Dr Omid Behbahani is leaving CAIS after three years teaching and researching in the Persian program. Working with the Persian program convenor, Dr Zahra Taheri, she has concentrated on teaching Intermediate and Advanced Persian. Many of her students have excelled in the program and have come to the end of their studies with highly valued skills in Persian language and Iranian literature, history and culture. A number of the CAIS Persian students have had the opportunity to test their skills by visiting Iran or Afghanistan, while others have been fortunate to spend time conversing with members of the Persian community in Canberra. Dr Behbahani will return to her position as Associate Professor in the Department of Ancient Iranian Languages and Culture at the Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies in Tehran to continue her work on historical linguistics (Manichaean, Middle Persian, Parthian and Soghdian Texts of Turfan) and Classical and Modern Persian Literature.

PERSIAN ONLINE

Dr Behbahani commenced her appointment as CAIS was midway on the establishment of the Online Persian program. Since taking up her position, Dr Behbahani has worked closely with the CASS Educational Development Studio, including Persian specialist Ms Narjess Afzaly, on the creation of several stages of online Intermediate and Advanced Persian. The online Persian program is now complete and is available for students from both Australia and abroad to enrol. So far, students who have enrolled in the program are enjoying the high standards maintained throughout the program and are learning the language as well as those who are completing the in-class options.

“Starting the Online Persian has been one of the best things I could have done, at times exciting and exhilarating as well as hard work, but definitely a labour of love. I have discovered an interest in reading modern Persian literature and translating it into English while trying to maintain the beauty of its subtle humour and irony. I hope to return to Iran so I will use what I have learnt. I want to say that having Dr Behbahani has been an absolute boon, she knew how to extract the best from her students and we have had a wonderful time doing it.”

Janine - taking Persian online from Melbourne
“Between 30 August and 8 September 2016 I took part in the Summer Scholarship for a Study Trip in Turkey. This program ran by the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism brought together over twenty postgraduate students from around the World whose areas of study and research focused on Turkey or more broadly the Middle East. I am a masters student at CAIS with a particular interest in modern Turkish politics. The trip included Istanbul, Ankara, and what is known as the Lycian region of southern Anatolia.

While in Istanbul we visited the many Ottoman and Byzantine attractions of Istanbul, including the Blue Mosque, Topkapi Palace, Dolmabahce Palace and my personal favourite Hagia Sophia. We also had an opportunity to visit one of many antiquity museums in Istanbul which held one of the earliest peace treaties between the Hittites and the Egyptians. Coming so soon after the attack on Ataturk airport and the July coup attempt, Istanbul was almost completely devoid of tourists, and as were the other towns we visited, covered in the flag.

While in Ankara we were briefly guests of the Turkish Foreign Ministry which treated us to a lunch and three topical presentations. The first was an overview of Turkish foreign policy, its long-term alliance with the US, and its candidate country status for EU membership set the limits of enhancing Turkish-Chinese relations. These factors limit Turkey-China relations to the economic sphere.

Throughout the rest of the trip, we travelled throughout the Lycian region of southern Anatolia, visiting numerous archaeological sites of Hellenic and Roman origin as well as two very impressive antiquity museums. In addition, we visited a number of Anatolian villages and smaller towns as well as an Alevi assembly house which held the tomb of Abdal Musa.

It was an incredible opportunity to see Turkey during a very interesting period which further inspired me to continue my focus on this country. It also allowed me to make friends with really interesting people with whom I have a common academic interest.”

CAIS MASTERS STUDENT VISITS TURKEY

CAIS lecturer, Dr Murat Yurtbilir and research scholar, Victoria Xiaoli Guo participated in an international conference in which one of the central themes was Turkey’s foreign policy in relation to China.

The Fifth International Forum on Asia and the Middle East: A global perspective on Middle East Governance, was held at the Shanghai International Studies University, on 24-25 September.

Dr Yurtbilir’s paper was entitled: ‘Turkish Foreign Policy and China: Strategic prospects and imminent challenges for the 2020s’. In the paper, he argued that Turkey’s NATO membership, its long-term alliance with the US, and its candidate country status for EU membership set the limits of enhancing Turkish-Chinese relations. These factors limit Turkey-China relations to the economic sphere.

In Ms Guo’s paper, ‘Is Turkey Acting Fairly? Turkey’s Choice of the T-LORAMIDS’, she discussed the recent challenges arising from Turkey’s attempts to acquire a new missile defence system.
GRADUATIONS — HIGHER DEGREES BY RESEARCH (HDR)

Congratulations to Dr Huda Al-Tamimi, who has been awarded a doctoral degree for her thesis entitled, 'The Changing State for Iraqi Women: Political and Social Mobilisation for Iraqi Women Members of Parliament Post-2003'. Dr Al-Tamimi, pictured here with her supervisor, Professor James Piscatori, at a gathering to celebrate her achievement.

AL-FALASI PRIZE

The Al-Falasi prize is awarded annually to the student with the overall best grades in the Master of Middle Eastern & Central Asian Studies (Advanced). In 2016 Al-Falasi prize will be awarded to Susan Thompson. Susan’s sub-thesis was entitled, ‘A Comparison of Islamist Movements in Turkey and Egypt: The AKP and the Muslim Brotherhood from the 20th Century to the present’.

HDR THESIS SUBMISSIONS

Two CAIS research scholars have submitted their doctoral theses this semester: Aminat Chokobaeva researched the topic, ‘The role of the 1916 ‘Great Revolt’ of Central Asia in shaping national identity in Soviet and post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan’; and Caroline Ladewig has completed work on, ‘Power, Epistemology and Pedagogy: Critical Thinking and Female Teacher Education in Oman’.

FIELDWORK

Maria Syed was a Visiting Fellow at the King Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia as part of her fieldwork during May 2016. Maria has been awarded a Fellowship as a Visiting Research Scholar focusing on nuclear security at the Sandia National Laboratories, in Albuquerque, New Mexico, from January to April 2017. The fellowship is sponsored by Sandia National Laboratories and the United States Department of Energy.

NEW RESEARCH SCHOLARS AT CAIS

CAIS welcomed two research scholars in second semester 2016: Anas Iqtait (pictured right) and Setayesh Nooraninejad (pictured left). Setayesh is researching the Iran-Iraq war the history of soldiers’ letters; the study of individual experience, history of scribal culture and writing practice as a social phenomenon, and the study of cultural artefacts. She has a Masters degree in Human Rights and Democratisation from the University of Sydney.

Anas’ research involves a study of Palestinian-Israeli conflict, economic and international relations of the Middle East, political economy of development and international donations, aid rentierism, state formation in fragile and post-conflict states. He is Palestinian with a keen interest in the political economy of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the effectiveness of international donations in the region. Anas’ previous education includes a Master of international development policy from Seoul National University in Korea and a Bachelor of Economics from Methodist University in Fayetteville, North Carolina. He has worked in the international aid industry in Palestine with the United Nations, Oxfam, and the Korean International Development Agency (KOICA). He has also worked in the financial services industry with leading private equity and Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Arab Gulf.

3 MINUTE THESIS SUCCESS

CAIS research scholar Katja Theodorakis (pictured right) was a finalist in the ANU 3 Minute Thesis (3MT) competition. The 3MT is an international competition for graduate students to showcase their research. Students speak for three minutes on the nature of their research and why it is important, with only a single PowerPoint slide. Katja gained entry to the ANU finals having received an equal first place in the College round. Katja’s research is entitled: ‘Caliphate Calling: Understanding the appeal of radical Islam as a challenge to liberal modernity’. For the 3MT final she spoke on the topic: ‘Thinking like jihadis do?’ The following is an edited extract from Katja’s speech.

‘Jihadis are the scripted villains of our time. Just like the communists before them, they are the enemy of everything we hold dear - our way of life, our values and most of all, our freedom. Death and destruction are seen as their creed, and this makes them not only evil but devoid of humanity. Yet jihadis themselves believe they are the Jedi of this world, representing the powerless and sacrificing themselves to fight injustice. In essence, they see jihad as a moral cause for a better world, a world in which we are the villains. My research explores the moral motivations of those who join jihad from Western societies. I am examining the first-hand accounts of Western fighters through their media testimonies, blog posts, twitter feeds and direct interviews.’
RESEARCH, PUBLICATIONS, OUTREACH ACTIVITIES


LECTURES, SEMINARS & CONFERENCES
‘Moscow’s (In)dispensable Ally: Tajikistan in contemporary Russian foreign policy thinking’, Putin’s Russia in the Wake of the Cold War Conference, ANU Humanities Research Centre, 24-26 August 2016.
Political Islam Seminars, July, September, October and November 2016.

OUTREACH
‘The Centrality of Central Asia (to say nothing about the Middle East)’, ANU Open Day presentation, 27 August 2016.

MEDIA
4 television and radio interviews.

ZAHRA TAHERI
BOOK
Sokut-e Kohan-e Ayeneha, (The Silence of the Ancient Mirrors: Alamtaj Ghaem-Maghami’s life and poetry), Sales Publisher, Tehran, Iran, June 2016, pp. 198.

JOURNAL ARTICLES

MINERVA NASSER EDDINE
BOOK CHAPTER

FRANCE MEYER
BOOK
(translation from French to Arabic) Frankenstein à Bagdad by Ahmed Saadawi, (Piranha, Paris, 2016, pp 378.)

RAIHNAM ISMAIL
BOOK CHAPTER

LECTURES, SEMINARS & CONFERENCES
Political Islam Seminars, September, October and November 2016.

M. MURAT YURTBLIR
FEATURE ARTICLES
‘Was Turkey’s coup a stroke of genius or an amateurish move?’, News.com, 18 July 2016. [news.com.au/world/europe/turkeys-coup-a-stroke-of-genius-or-an-amateurish-move/news-story/5037a99b1aa1fa39d144f1f368cbd0c9]
‘More questions asked as to whether the failed Turkish coup was staged’, The New Daily, 20 July 2016. [thenewdaily.com.au/news/world/2016/07/20/failed-turkish-coup-staged/]
‘A putsch, power-grab, and purge’, Policy Forum, 2 August 2016. [policyforum.net/putch-power-purge/]

LECTURES, SEMINARS & CONFERENCES
The Coup Attempt in Turkey: Background, the plot, and the aftermath, ANU CAIS Majlis Discussion, 2 September 2016.

DAMIAN DOYLE
FEATURE ARTICLE

VICTORIA GUO
FEATURE ARTICLE

ANAS IQTAIT
FEATURE ARTICLE

LECTURES, SEMINARS & CONFERENCES

‘Turkish Foreign Policy and China: Strategic prospects and imminent challenges for the 2020s’, The Fifth International Forum on Asia and the Middle East: A global perspective on Middle East governance, Shanghai International Studies University, 24-25 September 2016.

INTERVIEWS
‘Who was behind Turkey’s attempted military coup?’, 2SER Breakfast, 19 July 2016.
‘Further post-coup arrests and crackdowns on dissenting voices in Turkey’, Saturday Extra, ABC Radio, 12 November 2016. More than ten interviews with TV and radio stations including ABC, SBS, Sky News
Dr Shakira Hussein (University of Western Australia) discussed the danger of the far-right’s responses to Islamophobia and the importance for Muslims to respond appropriately when confronted by anti-Muslim racism.

Ms Amne Al-Rifa'i (Independent author and social commentator) gave a very moving account of her life growing up and working as a Muslim in Australia.

The final session looked at strategies for preventing female recruits in Australia. Dr Leah Farrall (National Security College, ANU), discussed avoiding conflict and disenfranchising young people both within Muslim communities and the wider Australian community.

Jacinta Carroll (Head of Counter-Terrorism Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy institute) made the link between gender equality and extremism and argued grievances, both real and perceived, need to be addressed. She said the way forward necessitated research and dedicated funding for multi-sector CVE programs and initiatives. She also recommended the establishment of an Information sharing hub and greater dissemination of information including the testimonials of those who had experienced violent extremism.

Finally, Professor Samina Yasmeen (Centre for Muslim States and Societies, University of Western Australia) outlined an argument that in order to reach out to communities in Australia the government has to work toward an atmosphere of mutual respect, that is, both the government and the Muslim community have to cultivate respect for one another.
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